Because of these characteristics it is one
of the most informative and stimulating books to be written in this area.
Now we come to the expanded seven-part
typology, which is helpfully summarized in a chart on p. 108:
Non-affirming Viewpoints
Prohibition: same-gender desire and
behavior is a perversion of God's created order ("intrinsically evil" and
"objectively disordered" in Roman Catholic parlance); this created order is
the chief source of guidance (often in the form of "natural law") concerning
the kinds of behavior intended by God.
Toleration: same-gender orientation
is a tragic burden, and same-gender people are to be welcomed but their
lifestyle is not to be affirmed; their appropriate response is repentance
and abstinence.
Accommodation: same-gender desire
is one of the many consequences of fallen human life, but it is open to
traces of grace; thus exclusive same-sex partnerships, while disobedient in
form, are the lesser of evils if monogamous.
Welcoming and Affirming Viewpoints
Legitimation: same-gender desire is
like all other sinful conditions; thus we should not single out gay sins
while ignoring other sins, and we need to create a just world in which
differences cease to be important.
Celebration: homosexuality is a
fact of natural life, to be regarded as God's good gift.
Liberation: Cultural attitudes
toward same-sex orientation are socially constructed and usually are caught
up in wider injustices; therefore we need to challenge binary gender
classifications and affirm the complexity of gender choices.
The Welcoming, Affirming, and Ordering Viewpoint
Consecration: sexual orientation is
ambiguous, needing to be rightly ordered by consecrating one's sexuality in
an exclusive, committed relationship blessed by the church.
A dialectical process is at work here, acknowledging points made by the more
negative positions but noting their weaknesses and contradictions, then
moving toward other positions that accept many of the points made by the
earlier positions (at least pedagogically and strategically) but go beyond
them. Yet it is acknowledged that even the more positive viewpoints have
their weaknesses, sometimes by being naively positive, sometimes by failing
to acknowledge the vulnerability of human life. Thus the resolution must be
a complex one that acknowledges difficulties and requires a committed
response. One cannot help but be reminded of the "moral development"
theories put forward by Kohlberg and Foster, moving from punishment to
convention to social contract and autonomous reasoning. But this is a better
one, sensitive to the many complexities of Christian anthropology.
The "consecration" approach, which may
look at first glance like a wild, far-out position, was set forth in a
classic essay entitled "The Body's Grace" by Rowan Williams while he was a
Regius Professor, before he became Archbishop of Canterbury. It
emphasizes not the orders of creation, not rules for conduct, not repentance
alone, but God's call into covenant relationship and the offer of
sanctification through the Holy Spirit. Rather than the "textualism" of the
non-affirming positions and the "contextualism" of the welcoming and
affirming positions it calls on us to "consider what the gospel is bringing
into being in our own context" (p. 98), which means concretely that
sexuality must be respected and ordered with awareness that "it is not sex
but rather humans who are God's good gift" (p. 100). This approach looks not
to a fixed, legalistic order of creation, not to the abiding conflict of
simul iustus et peccator, but to a dynamic, performative order of
redemption, a context in which grace can abound. Rather than celebrating
sexuality it calls for ordering, but ordering that is covenantal in nature,
with the free participation of all who are involved.
On this basis Johnson moves into a
consideration of the theology of marriage, focusing on companionship,
commitment, and community; it is in this context that he
examines the biblical passages that are often cited, coming to conclusions
that do not deny but deepen Scripture, reading with it
in order to see beyond what its writers themselves could envision (p.
110).
Johnson points out that in Galatians Paul
lists the works of the flesh (5:19-21), then goes on to list the fruits of
the Spirit (5:22-23), adding that, with regard to these, "there is no law."
This is perhaps the core of his "consecration" approach. It genuinely fits
Paul's ethics, for Paul often emphasized freedom, spontaneity, confidence,
going beyond the letter of the law and often defying the spirit of legalism.
Even before Paul the early church made new openings to Gentiles, eunuchs,
and women. Our own Reformed tradition speaks of the "third use of the law" —
not regulating outward behavior, not convicting people of sin, but offering
guidance to those who consent to be guided by the Spirit (C-4.086; 5.085;
6.106; 6.108).
There's the theology, and it is a valid
one, drawing upon important if often neglected aspects of the Bible and the
doctrinal tradition. But how does it relate to the political, legislative,
and legal struggles of recent years? These struggles are so important that
it is valuable for non-lawyers to learn their way around the case law and
the legal principles that have been applied, often affecting GLBT people in
intensely personal ways.
Johnson argues that same-gender
relationships should not only be "consecrated within our religious
communities" but "validated within our legal systems" and "welcomed
within the framework of our democratic polity" (p. 3). How does he support
this?
The Constitution says that persons are to
receive "due process" and have "equal protection" under the law. That is why
he takes a dim view of the anti-gay referendums that were successful in a
number of states (Colorado's and Nebraska's were especially notorious): in
the name of majority rule, and often with the claim that GLBT people are
being given "special rights," they discriminate against some citizens and
deprive them of equal protection and due process, not because of any
criminal behavior but simply because of who they are. This is the main
reason given by the courts when they strike them down. It is not "judicial
activism" but a consistent reading of the Constitution. Rights are not
subject to majority vote.
Johnson argues, against the strict
constructionists, that the Constitution acknowledges liberties that are
prior to and broader than the Constitution itself (hence the "right to
privacy," which is not there in so many words but emerges from a long series
of legal decisions). Democracy means more than majority rule. It even means
more than following the procedures explicitly laid down in the Constitution.
Thus it is necessary to develop a theory of "deliberative democracy," which
means giving reasons that are "mutually acceptable and generally accessible"
to a broad public, with the understanding that decisions remain open to
challenge and revision in the future (p. 208, citing Amy Gutman and Dennis
Thompson). This is, we might say, the political analogue of the
"consecration" approach in Christian ethics, not resting with what is
written in stone, as Alabama's "Ten Commandments judge" Roy Moore would have
us do, but calling for mutual responsibility and openness to new insights.
And just as the consecration approach goes beyond both repression and
celebration, deliberative democracy requires us to go beyond both the
communitarian insistence on shared values and the traditional liberal
rhetoric of "rights" to a consideration of consequences and a more
reflective language of "goods" (pp. 213-18; 318, n. 70).
Recent victories and setbacks have often
revolved around the issue of "gay marriage" and the alternatives to it,
intensely debated in recent years. Here again we are given some helpful
clarifications. A number of European countries have made provision for
"registered partnerships" or "domestic partnerships," recognizing that a
same-sex couple constitute a household and even a family. But this falls far
short of the marital rights that are embedded in U.S. law. Another
alternative is "civil unions," adopted by the Vermont legislature and signed
into law by Howard Dean. This has the advantage of adopting a different
label and letting "marriage" have its customary meaning. But even when it
offers the same rights and privileges under state law, it is not the
equivalent of marriage under federal law, especially after DOMA (the Defense
of Marriage Act), signed by Bill Clinton in 1996. Analysts count 1138
benefits under federal law that can go only to heterosexual couples. Under
present circumstances, civil unions are "separate but not equal."
